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R. v. Saeed: Penile Privacy and
Penal Policy
Christine Mainville*

I. INTRODUCTION
What’s in a swab? When it comes to the law of search incident to
arrest, the answer to that question turns out to be significant. In R. v.
Saeed,1 the police took a swab of the suspect’s penis, purportedly
incident to arrest, in order to link him to a sexual assault that had just
taken place. Faced with the question of whether this was a permissible
extension of that common law search power, the Court focussed
primarily on the privacy interest in the information contained in the
swab, rather than on the privacy interest engaged by the intimate nature
of the area being searched. Because the information sought related to the
complainant rather than the accused, the warrantless search was deemed
permissible notwithstanding its intrusiveness.
Instinctually, people with civil libertarian inclinations may well
have hoped and expected the opposite result to be reached, based on
the fact that the body part targeted was the suspect’s penis. A search
in respect of such an intimate place on one’s body and the seizure
of bodily samples therefrom must surely require prior judicial
authorization, or exigent circumstances. But the line of cases that have
endorsed strip searches and other types of searches of the person under
the authority of the power to search incident to arrest meant that a
closer look needed to be taken to resolve the issue. In many respects,
the issue in Saeed was a contest between the authority of Golden2 — in
respect of strip searches — and that of Stillman3 — in respect of the
seizure of bodily samples. The Supreme Court in those earlier cases
held that the common law search power permitted the former (albeit
*

Partner, Henein Hutchison LLP, email: <cmainville@hhllp.ca>.
[2016] S.C.J. No. 24, 2016 SCC 24 (S.C.C.) hereinafter “Saeed”.
2
R. v. Golden, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, 2001 SCC 83, 2001 3 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.)
hereinafter “Golden”.
3
R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, 1997 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.) hereinafter “Stillman”.
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under a modified search incident to arrest framework), but prohibited
the latter. The application of Stillman was complicated by the fact that
the search for bodily substances on Mr. Saeed did not target his own
bodily substances, but rather those of the complainant. These were
susceptible to degradation or to being washed off.
When considering whether new investigative methods could be
performed pursuant to the power to search incident to arrest, the common
law has striven to strike the appropriate balance between the privacy
interests of the accused and valid law enforcement objectives. While the
Court in Saeed considered a number of factors to make this
determination, this article argues that it overstated the importance of the
informational privacy interest being impacted, and failed to sufficiently
recognize the acute personal privacy interest engaged in that area of the
body aptly referred to in common parlance as a person’s “private parts”.
It did so in spite of clear indications in Grant4 that the level of
intrusiveness of a bodily search will generally turn on the latter.

II. FACTS
The accused Saeed was suspected of having viciously raped a young
woman he had just met at a small gathering. The 15-year-old complainant
had been quite intoxicated and ended up staying at the host’s apartment to
sleep it off. Just prior to 4:00 a.m., she stepped outside to search for a friend
with whom she had attended the party. She was suddenly attacked and
sexually assaulted on the front lawn of the apartment building. In public
view, the perpetrator pushed her to the ground, hit her several times and
tore her clothes. The assault included penetration.
After hearing the complainant’s screams, her two friends happened
upon the assault in progress and pulled the man off of her. At least one of
the friends recognized him as Saeed.5 One of the friends drove the victim
home, at which time the police were contacted. The victim was brought
to the hospital where various injuries to her body were observed. The
police arrived at the apartment building by 5:44 a.m. and arrested Saeed
on the identification information provided by one of the friends. The
arrest took place at 6:05 a.m. at the same location where the assault
had taken place.6
4
5
6

R. v. Grant, [2009] S.C.J. No. 32, 2009 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) hereinafter “Grant”.
This identification evidence was later weakened at trial.
Saeed, supra, note 1, at paras. 13-14.
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Saeed was mistakenly released from the police station between 7:00
and 7:30 a.m., and was re-arrested at 8:35 a.m.7 This apparently notable
fact turned out to be a red herring given that Saeed appears to have
remained in the presence of a police officer at all times during this
mishap. Indeed, a police officer accompanied him back to the apartment
building upon his release, at which time another officer who was still on
scene at the apartment recognized that he should not yet have been
released. Saeed was immediately re-arrested and turned back around
for a second trip to the police station. Thus, at no time during this
intervening period could he have taken a shower or otherwise cleansed
himself of the DNA evidence that would prove so central at trial.8
At the station, Saeed spoke with counsel. The supervising officer at
that point determined that a penile swab should be taken in order to
preserve evidence of the complainant’s DNA, which they believed would
at that time still be located on Mr. Saeed’s penis. The swab was not taken
right away because the Officer trained to undertake this task was busy
gathering evidence at the crime scene. When she returned about an hour
later, she instructed an officer of the same gender as the accused on how
to go about taking a swab. The swab was taken around 10:45 a.m. For a
period of 30 to 40 minutes prior to the search, Saeed was handcuffed to
the wall of a cell with no running water, in order to prevent the
destruction of evidence.9 (The handcuffs were intended to prevent him
from licking his hands or otherwise washing away evidence.)
The swab ultimately revealed the presence of the complainant’s DNA.
At trial, the main issue was identity. The accused was convicted.

III. THE SECTION 8 CHARTER ARGUMENT
Both the trial judge and the Alberta Court of Appeal held that the
DNA evidence obtained by way of the penile swab performed incident to
arrest was admissible. However, both courts also held that the swab had
violated Saeed’s section 8 right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure. The majority in the Court of Appeal ruled that the search was
governed by Stillman. In their view, Stillman dictated that a seizure of
bodily material — which inevitably entails a significant infringement
7

Id., at para. 15.
Based on the expert evidence adduced at trial, that did not however exclude the
possibility that the complainant’s DNA could have otherwise been effaced. Still, the fact that he was
erroneously released did not impact that one way or the other.
9
Saeed, supra, note 1, at para. 21.
8
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upon a person’s dignity — requires the person’s consent, a warrant, or
exigent circumstances. The Supreme Court would come to disagree.
Recall that the issue in Stillman was whether the police could take
hair samples, buccal swabs, and teeth impressions from a detained
person, pursuant to the power to search incident to arrest. Justice Cory on
behalf of a majority of the Court answered in the negative, given the
invasiveness of the searches and seizures and the seriousness of the
incursion on Mr. Stillman’s privacy and dignity. Even the taking of a
discarded tissue containing the accused’s DNA was deemed to infringe
section 8, in light of the fact that Mr. Stillman was in police custody (and
thus not free to dispose of his bodily substances as he wished) and had
expressly refused to provide any bodily samples to the police. Still, the
Court held that the tissue evidence could be admitted on a section 24(2)
analysis given that its seizure did not interfere with his bodily integrity
and did not impact his dignity. That particular violation was thus deemed
not to be serious.
Stillman has since stood for the proposition that the seizure of
bodily samples from a person is impermissible in the absence of a
warrant, consent, statutory authorization, or exigent circumstances.
The defence in Saeed argued that Stillman was directly applicable,
notwithstanding the fact that the bodily samples sought to be obtained
from the accused were not his own.
The Crown in Saeed instead took the position that Golden ought to
drive the analysis. The Crown did not argue that the general search
incident to arrest framework was sufficient to adequately protect the
privacy interests engaged. But it reasoned that a modified framework
could do so, such that there did not need to be a categorical
prohibition on the practice following an arrest.10 Golden resolved the
question of whether a strip search could be carried out incident to
arrest. In that case, the strip search was aimed at the discovery of
illegal drugs on the accused’s person. Observing that a strip search had
the potential to be “a humiliating, degrading and traumatic experience
for individuals subject to them”,11 the Court devised a more stringent
test to limit recourse to the procedure to instances where they were
truly justified, and to ensure that they were performed in a reasonable
manner. To be conducted incident to arrest, there must be grounds to
believe a strip search is necessary to discover weapons or evidence
10
11

Saeed, supra, note 1, at paras. 40 and 41.
Golden, supra, note 2, at para. 83.
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related to the reason for the arrest.12 The search also needs to be
carried out in accordance with restrictive guidelines.13
The issue before the Supreme Court in Saeed was thus largely framed
as a contest between the Stillman approach and the Golden approach.
The justices parted ways on which should apply, leading to three
different results. The majority held that the penile search was permitted
pursuant to the power to search incident to arrest, under a qualified test
like that adopted by the Court in Golden. Justices Karakatsanis,
concurring, and Abella, dissenting, rejected this modulated approach,
essentially on the basis that Stillman was authoritative. Justice Abella
would have excluded the evidence under section 24(2), whereas
Karakatsanis J. held that the evidence could nevertheless be admitted.
The divide between the two mainly rested on the characterization of the
police conduct as stemming from good faith and the weight to be
afforded to the police’s failure to consider both a warrant and the
possibility that the Criminal Code did not even provide for a warrant that
would authorize this type of search and seizure.

IV. MOLDAVER J.’S MAJORITY JUDGMENT
The majority focussed its analysis on the requirement that a power to
search incident to arrest must ultimately be reasonable.14 When examining
whether new investigative methods meet the reasonableness test, courts
have tried to strike the appropriate balance between an accused’s privacy
rights and valid law enforcement goals. Justice Moldaver suggested that
when the privacy interests at stake were “significant”, one of two outcomes
was possible: either they will be so significant (“almost inviolable”) that the
power to search incident to arrest will simply be unavailable, or they will be
significant but to a lesser extent, such that a modified framework will be
required for the search incident to arrest to be permissible. What’s clear is
that anytime a significant privacy interest is intruded upon, the traditional
unmodified search incident to arrest framework will not apply: “In these
cases, the existing general framework of the common law power of search
incident to arrest must instead be tailored to ensure the search will be
Charter-compliant.”15
12
13
14
15

Id., at para. 98.
See Golden, id., at paras. 99 and 101-102.
Saeed, supra, note 1, at para. 4.
Id., at para. 5.
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Justice Moldaver acknowledged the undeniable: that a penile swab
is a “significant intrusion” on an accused’s privacy interests.16 But he
stopped short of declaring that the privacy interests engaged by this
technique were near-inviolable. In his view, requiring that two criteria
be met, over and above the three general prerequisites for a search to
be validly conducted incident to arrest,17 would suffice to render the
warrantless search constitutionally permissible. The two criteria are:18
(1) there must be reasonable grounds to believe that the search will
reveal and preserve evidence of the offence for which the accused
was arrested; and
(2) the search must be conducted in a reasonable manner.
This last prerequisite, in turn, means that the penile swab will have to
conform to several guidelines, akin to those that must guide the
execution of a strip search.19
In other words, Moldaver J. set out pre-conditions for carrying out a
penile swab incident to arrest similar to those applicable to strip searches
pursuant to Golden. One might say that Golden thus prevailed over
Stillman.20 However, Moldaver J. did not dispute Stillman’s ratio. Rather,
he distinguished it from the case at hand. The question thus becomes:
What was it that, for the majority, sufficiently distinguished the privacy
interests at stake in Saeed to those at stake in Stillman?

16

Id., at paras. 6 and 56. See also para. 42.
(1) That the search be pursuant to a lawful arrest; (2) that it be “truly incidental” to the arrest,
i.e., that it be “for a valid law enforcement purpose related to the reasons for the arrest”; and (3) that
it be conducted reasonably. See, for instance, id., at para. 37; R. v. Fearon, [2014] S.C.J. No. 77, 2014
SCC 77, 2014 3 S.C.R. 621, at para. 27 (S.C.C.) hereinafter “Fearon”.
18
Saeed, id., at paras. 6 and 42.
19
Id., at para. 78.
20
The Criminal Lawyers’ Association (CLA) presented a persuasive argument that
reliance on Golden was misplaced, writing, inter alia, at 4-5 of its factum [hereinafter “CLA,
Factum”]:
17

A strip search, like other searches incident to arrest, is simply “a pragmatic extension to
the power of arrest.” … Often, the offence for which the detainee has been arrested
cannot be substantiated, and the detainee cannot be dealt with, without the search. In
contrast, DNA evidence from a genital swab will not yield useful results for weeks or
months. It is of no immediate value to an investigation, or to the pressing decisions police
must make, such as whether to lay a charge or give bail to a detainee. …
Finally, strip searches are designed to respond to a strategy employed by offenders to
avoid detection. … As a policy matter, prohibiting strip searches or requiring a warrant
for everyone might encourage these tactics, and tend to hamper effective law
enforcement. Those concerns do not apply to the taking of genital samples.
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V. DISTINGUISHING STILLMAN: THE PRIVACY INTERESTS IMPACTED
BY A PENILE SWAB
The case law has come to classify certain privacy interests as
“territorial”, “informational”, or “personal”. All three of these “zones or
realms of privacy” were engaged in Dyment,21 a seminal case involving a
doctor taking a blood sample from a patient without the patient’s consent
or knowledge, and subsequently providing that sample to the police. The
personal claims to privacy were described there as “those related to the
person”, in contrast to “those involving territorial or spatial aspects” and
“those that arise in the information context”.22 While Moldaver J. does
not resort to these categorical distinctions in describing the interests
impacted by a penile swab, it is useful to conceptualize them in this way.
Justice Moldaver begins by distinguishing the privacy interests at stake
in Saeed from the ones that were said to be impacted by the taking of bodily
samples in Stillman. The first factor he cites to make that distinction is that
“a penile swab is not designed to seize the accused’s own bodily materials
but rather, the complainant’s.”23 He observes that “accused persons do not
have a significant privacy interest in a complainant’s DNA”.24 This factor
thus focusses on the informational privacy interest at stake.
In support of the proposition that Stillman only applies to the
accused’s own bodily samples, he cites the following passage from
Cory J.’s reasons: “seizing samples of the accused’s own body to
obtain information about him without his consent intrudes on an
accused’s privacy and dignity in a very significant way”.25 But quite
apart from analyzing whether this was the extent of what Stillman
stood for, Moldaver J. views this factor as carrying substantial weight
in the ultimate analysis. In going on to find that the intrusion on the
accused’s privacy interests was not so significant as to fall outside the
scope of the power to search incident to arrest, he again highlights the
fact that the accused’s own DNA or bodily substance — while it may
be swept up in the process26 — is not what was being sought.
R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 (S.C.C.) hereinafter “Dyment”.
Id., at para. 19.
23
Saeed, supra, note 1, at para. 45.
24
Id., at para. 47.
25
Id., at para. 44 (emphasis added by the Court), citing Stillman, supra, note 3, at para. 42,
quoting with approval Dyment, supra, note 21, at 431-32.
26
While Moldaver J. acknowledges that the accused’s DNA will in all likelihood also be
obtained from the swab, he underscores the fact that, in accordance with Stillman, the police could
not make any use of it absent a warrant: Saeed, supra, note 1, at para. 67.
21
22
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The second feature that Moldaver J. says distinguishes Stillman from
the case at hand, is that a penile swab can in fact be less invasive than the
procedures resorted to in Stillman:
A penile swab is in some ways less invasive than a two-hour long
process for taking dental impressions and forcefully removing hair from
an accused’s body. As a general rule, it will be quick and painless. It is not
penetrative. No objects or substances are placed inside the accused. Nor
does the swab involve ‘the forcible taking of parts of a person’.… While
the accused is required to expose a private area of his body to conduct the
swab, the procedure for taking the swab is not invasive.27

Again, these factors are cited later in the judgment when Moldaver J.
conducts an independent analysis of the relative intrusiveness of penile
swabs.28 These considerations generally relate to the extent to which the
manner of search impacts on the personal privacy interest engaged.
Finally, Moldaver J. cites the fact that “the accused’s DNA or bodily
impressions do not change, degrade, or disappear over time”.29 In other
words, “there is no reason the police need to rush to seize this
evidence.”30 By contrast,
evidence of the complainant’s DNA degrades over time. The accused
can also destroy this evidence, whether intentionally or accidentally. It
cannot be said that this evidence is in ‘no danger of disappearing’.…31

Although this last factor does make Saeed distinguishable from the
facts in Stillman, and is indeed a valid and persuasive consideration, it
relates to the pressing law enforcement objective at hand, and not to the
degree to which the search impacts the privacy interests of the accused.
While it must therefore be factored into the ultimate balancing exercise,
it does not assist with the determination of whether the privacy interests
engaged are “so significant” as to be inviolable.
Aside from those factors that he says sets Saeed apart from Stillman,
Moldaver J. does go on to consider more specifically the personal
privacy interest being impacted. This factor relates both to the fact that
the search is of a person, and to the actual area on the person being
searched. In that respect, he concludes that while a penile swab relates to
a most private area of the body, that is the only factor that renders the
27
28
29
30
31

Saeed, id., at para. 49.
See para. 55, id.
Id., at para. 44; Stillman, supra, note 3, at para. 49.
Saeed, id., at para. 44.
Id., at para. 50.
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search and seizure intrusive.32 All other factors — as he distinguished
them from Stillman — diminished the intrusiveness of the search.

VI. QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE RESULT IN SAEED
Because the majority in Saeed reaffirmed Stillman’s main holding —
that the police cannot seize the accused’s own bodily samples incident to
arrest — the end result is that cutting off a lock of hair or clipping a
fingernail will be off-limits incident to arrest, but swabbing the accused’s
penis will not be. The former have been deemed too intrusive to be
conducted incident to arrest, without proper judicial authorization or the
person’s consent.33 Ultimately, this necessarily turns on the informational
privacy interest being impacted, i.e., the fact that the bodily materials
sought belong to the accused and thus reveal information about him.34
The length of time and level of intrusiveness involved in the taking
of the bodily sample will not be determinative. While some of the
procedures used in Stillman were invasive in respect of their duration and
the pain or discomfort they occasioned, not all procedures captured by its
holding will engage these considerations. Indeed, many of them are
relatively non-invasive from a procedural and physical standpoint. Even
if a buccal swab aimed at obtaining the accused’s DNA is not
accompanied by the taking of dental impressions as it was in Stillman, it
32

Id., at para. 56.
The United States came to a different conclusion when it addressed the taking of a buccal
swab incident to arrest in the case of Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958 (2013) hereinafter “King”.
There, the U.S. Supreme Court held that taking and analyzing a swab for the arrestee’s DNA during
police booking procedures was minimally intrusive and thus permissible under the Fourth
Amendment (the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures) — even on a routine
basis and in the absence of individualized suspicion. However, “much of the Court’s analysis
hinged upon its conclusion that DNA plays a critical role in the state’s need to correctly identify
arrestees.”: S.J. Bachman, “Collection of DNA from Arrestees Charged with Serious Offenses
Reasonable Under the Fourth Amendment”, 44 Cumb. L. Rev. 319 at 322 (2013-2014) [hereinafter
“Bachman”]. The analysis might therefore differ in the case of a penile swab where the DNA sought
is not that of the arrestee and not for identification purposes.
34
Interestingly, and again quite at odds with the analysis of its Canadian counterpart, the U.S.
Supreme Court in King “largely confined its analysis to whether the physical intrusiveness of buccal
swabbing outweighs governmental interests.” The failure to fully consider the informational privacy
interest at stake was not without its share of critics: see, for e.g., C. Giannaros, “Unprecedented
Infringement: Debunking the Constitutionality of DNA Collection From Mere Arrestees in Light of
Maryland v. King”, 28 J. C.R. & Econ. Dev. 455 at 471 and ff. (2015-2016); G.M. Dery III, “Opening
One’s Mouth ‘For Royal Inspection’: The Supreme Court Allows Collection of DNA From Felony
Arrestees in Maryland v. King”, 2 Va. J. Crim. L. 116 at 138 and ff. (2014) [hereinafter “G.M. Dery III”];
S.B. Noronha, “Maryland v. King: Sacrificing the Fourth Amendment to Build Up the DNA Database”,
73 Md. L. Rev. 667 at 681 and ff. (2013-2014); Bachman, id., at 335-36.
33
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will remain impermissible as part of a search incident to arrest. Stillman’s
ratio will no doubt continue to apply to such a swab, even if it is the only
procedure being performed. Yet, just like a penile swab, that procedure is
very quick and does not cause any pain or discomfort.
Instead, procedures aimed at obtaining the accused’s own bodily
samples will generally be off-limits as part of a search conducted
incident to arrest, simply on the basis that the object is part of the
accused’s own body, whose integrity is not left whole. Because the penile
swab does not target the accused’s own bodily substance, it will
generally be permissible incident to arrest.
From the perspective of the privacy interests that are impacted, is this
defensible? While informational privacy interests are a relevant
consideration, surely most would consider the swabbing of one’s penis to
be a far greater intrusion into personal privacy than the taking of nail
clippings or the swabbing of a mouth. Yet the legal test is more stringent
for a mouth swab than a penis swab, if what is being sought on the penis
is not the accused’s own bodily samples (which, logically, will almost
always be the case, considering that the accused’s DNA could be
obtained less intrusively from many other parts of the body).
Justice Abella put it bluntly in her opening paragraph: “...If the taking
of hair, buccal and dental samples are ‘the ultimate invasion’ of an
individual’s privacy, one wonders how to conceptualize a search whereby
an individual is required to remove his clothes and swab his penis in
front of two uniformed police officers.”35
Considering the criticisms that Stillman has attracted over time for its
categorical approach to bodily samples, this incongruous result is
perhaps not so surprising. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé might have had a
point when she wrote in her dissent in Stillman that:
The type of search and seizure at issue constituted, in my opinion,
minimal affronts to the appellant’s bodily integrity. Combing or
plucking scalp hair is a procedure most people submit to daily
without any risk, trauma or pain. The same can be said for the
taking of buccal swabs which involves even less, if any, discomfort.
The seizure of pubic hair, on the other hand, is more intrusive
given it involves an intimate part of the body.36

Looking back, this seems to be a most sensible statement. It also appears
to reflect the course correction the Supreme Court took in 2009 in Grant,
35
36

Saeed, supra, note 1, at para. 131.
Stillman, supra, note 3, at para. 174 (emphasis added).
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when it began to distance itself from the Stillman approach — albeit in
the context of section 24(2).
The Stillman approach is ultra-protective of bodily integrity, no matter
the body part at issue. Everything emanating from the accused and
deemed “conscriptive” was lumped in together for section 24(2)
purposes. Stillman’s rationale was extended to all sorts of comparatively
non-intrusive items including breath samples. Under section 24(2), all of
these were rendered presumptively inadmissible because of the accused’s
compelled participation in the creation or discovery of the evidence.
Stillman’s approach to the exclusion of evidence was long criticized for
its overreach. These reproaches led — rightfully in my view — to a
jurisprudential trend away from it.

VII. GRANT AND THE PRIVACY INTERESTS IMPACTED BY BODILY
SEARCHES
Stillman led to anomalous results under section 24(2) of the Charter.
That is why the readjustment that the Court made in Grant was a
welcome change. Most significantly, the Court in Grant distanced itself
from the reasoning in Stillman — grounded on the right against selfincrimination — regarding the sacrosanct nature of bodily substances or
other things emanating from the accused, or obtained with the accused’s
participation. Indeed, in repositioning the place of bodily evidence in the
section 24(2) analysis, the Grant Court rejected the notion, stemming
from Stillman, that every type of bodily substance, because of its
conscriptive nature, should be treated the same way. Instead, it
recognized “the wide variation between different kinds of bodily
evidence” and the differing impacts the taking of bodily evidence could
have on the accused’s rights:37
...Plucking a hair from the suspect’s head may not be intrusive, and the
accused’s privacy interest in the evidence may be relatively slight. On the
other hand, a body cavity or strip search may be intrusive, demeaning and
objectionable. … The Charter concerns raised by the gathering of nontestimonial evidence are better addressed by reference to the interests of
privacy, bodily integrity and human dignity, than by a blanket rule that by
analogy to compelled statements, such evidence is always inadmissible.38

37
38

Grant, supra, note 4, at para. 103.
Id., at paras. 103 and 104. See also para. 109.
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This demotion of the concept of conscription implies, for instance, that
the fact that a breath sample comes from the accused does not assist
much with determining how intrusive it is. In many respects, Grant
“broke free from the lopsided, and arguable ideologically driven CollinsStillman framework”.39
Grant pushed back against viewing the impact on the accused’s interests
solely from a self-incrimination lens, and mandated that the focus instead
be on the interests impacted by the right at issue. Given that the right to be
protected against unreasonable search and seizure seeks to protect privacy
interests, the intrusiveness of the search will be dependent on the impact on
those privacy interests, as well as on the person’s bodily integrity and
human dignity. The extent of the intrusion on the privacy interests at stake
will be a factor of the expectation of privacy involved.
Interestingly, however, Grant seems to suggest that, when it comes to
bodily searches, the informational privacy interest engaged is of less
importance to the analysis than the personal privacy interest at play.
Indeed, the Court specifically observed that “an unjustified strip search
or body cavity search is demeaning to the suspect’s human dignity and
will be viewed as extremely serious on that account”.40 Critically, it
added that “...the fact that the evidence thereby obtained is not itself a
bodily sample cannot be seen to diminish the seriousness of the
intrusion.”41 In other words, subsequent to Grant, the fact that
information was obtained about the accused from the accused himself or
with his participation, is not the be all and end all.
This prioritizing of interests is not necessarily anomalous.
Expectation of privacy analyses have often been framed with a greater
focus on one or the other of the privacy interests engaged. Indeed, a
crucial part of the assessment first involves a determination of the nature
or subject matter of the alleged search and evidence in issue.42 The
outcome of a given case will often turn on how that subject matter is
defined and which privacy interest is accordingly prioritized. In
Tessling,43 for example, Binnie J. said that the analysis of whether
39

A. Cheon-Hayes, “From Stillman to Grant: When Form Becomes Substance” (Paper
presented to the 2012 National Criminal Justice Conference: Seven, Eight, Night: Silence, Searches
and Detention, Vancouver, April 2012), at 15.
40
Grant, supra, note 4, at para. 114.
41
Id., at para. 114 (emphasis added).
42
R. v. Patrick, [2009] S.C.J. No. 17, 2009 SCC 17, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579, at paras. 26-27,
29 (S.C.C.) hereinafter “Patrick”.
43
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at paras. 8-11,
24, 27-29 (S.C.C.) hereinafter “Tessling”.
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“FLIR” imaging of thermal energy or heat radiating from a residence
could be conducted without a warrant was better viewed not from the
lens of the territorial privacy interest in the home, but rather from the
informational privacy interest engaged as a result of the information that
could be gleaned from the home. This way of characterizing the issue led
to a different result than had been reached in the lower court, where the
emphasis had been on the territorial privacy interest at stake.44
Similarly, in Patrick, Binnie J. again viewed the subject matter of the
search of the Appellant’s discarded curb-side garbage as relating to
information about what was going on inside his home. The reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis therefore needed to proceed on that basis.45
In S.A.B., the Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of the
DNA warrant provisions. The impugned procedures implicated both
personal and informational privacy interests.46 There, the Court was of
the view that the informational privacy interest was “the central concern
involved in the collection of DNA information by the state.”47
Yet once Grant was decided, it stood for the proposition that when it
comes to bodily searches, the predominant privacy interest engaged will
in fact be personal, not informational.
These holdings in Grant deal with the section 24(2) inquiry into
whether evidence obtained pursuant to a Charter violation would “bring
the administration of justice into disrepute”. In particular, they relate to
the second step of that analysis aimed at determining the impact of
unconstitutional police conduct on the accused’s protected interests.
Ultimately, the considerations engaged by the test of whether a particular
type of search is so intrusive of a person’s protected interests as to be
impermissible incident to arrest are of the same nature. The result should
turn on these same principles.

VIII. WHAT GRANT OUGHT TO HAVE MEANT FOR SAEED
There is no doubt that Moldaver J.’s reasons in Saeed are consistent
with Grant to the extent that he does not engage in a consideration of the
“conscriptive” nature of the evidence nor does he overemphasize the
44

See also R. v. Gomboc, [2010] S.C.J. No. 55, 2010 SCC 55, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211, at
para. 49 (S.C.C.).
45
Patrick, supra, note 42, at para. 42.
46
R. v. S.A.B., [2003] S.C.J. No. 61, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 678, 2003 SCC 60, at para. 40 (S.C.C.)
hereinafter “S.A.B.”.
47
Id., at para. 48.
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sacrosanct nature of the body or the use that is made of it. However, one
might question whether Moldaver J. gives too much weight to the
lessened informational privacy interest engaged, and fails to give
sufficient weight to the acute personal privacy interest at stake.
Indeed, post-Grant, Moldaver J.’s central emphasis on the fact that
the search did not relate to the accused’s own bodily samples seems
misplaced. His statement that the level of intrusiveness of the penile
swab is “limited” because it is only intrusive as a result of the body part
searched, is also confounding. Even more at odds with the reasoning in
Grant is the observation that “...if the same search was conducted
elsewhere on the accused’s body — the back of his hands, for example
— there could be no suggestion that the swab was a ‘humiliating,
degrading and traumatic experience’.”48 This appears to directly ignore
the Court’s indications in Grant that the type of bodily search performed
and the area of the body searched — because of their impact on the
personal privacy interest of the accused — should in fact be central
considerations when assessing the impact of a search on the accused’s
privacy interests. Of course the swab would be far less intrusive if it was
performed on the back of the hand. But that misses the point. The penile
swab’s high level of intrusiveness stems primarily from the fact that it
relates to this most intimate area of the body.
This is not simply inconsistent with Grant, but also with other bodily
search cases that pre-dated it, including Golden itself. There, Iacobucci
and Arbour JJ. distinguished between various types of bodily searches,
making it clear that a look inside a person’s mouth is not in the same
category as a look inside his anus:
...This definition distinguishes strip searches from less intrusive ‘frisk’
or ‘pat-down’ searches, which do not involve the removal of clothing,
and from more intrusive body cavity searches, which involve a physical
inspection of the detainee’s genital or anal regions. While the mouth is
a body cavity, it is not encompassed by the term ‘body cavity search’.
Searches of the mouth do not involve the same privacy concerns,
although they may raise other health concerns for both the detainee and
for those conducting the search.49

Interestingly, more recently in Fearon, the Court lumped strip
searches in with the seizure of bodily samples, even though the former’s
aim is for foreign objects:
48
49

Saeed, supra, note 1, at para. 56. See also para. 61.
Golden, supra, note 2, at para. 47.
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In this respect, a cell phone search is completely different from the
seizure of bodily samples in Stillman and the strip search in Golden.
Such searches are invariably and inherently very great invasions of
privacy and are, in addition, a significant affront to human dignity.50

The one case that Moldaver J. does rely on in support of his assertion
that a key factor is the reduced expectation of privacy in the evidence
seized, is R. v. Monney.51 But Monney — which involved a bed pan vigil
for drugs secreted on the person — was set in a border context where a
person’s expectation of privacy in all respects (and in particular in
respect of contraband) is substantially reduced. The search was also
conducted pursuant to statutory powers and on both those bases, has
always been an outlier.52
This is also in contrast to Greffe,53 where a rectal examination was
conducted for contraband, but incident to the accused’s arrest for traffic
tickets. While the case ultimately turned on the search not having been
connected to the reason for the arrest (one of the fundamental prerequisites
of a valid search incident to arrest), Lamer J. (as he then was) observed that
“it is the intrusive nature of the rectal search and considerations of human
dignity and bodily integrity that demand the high standard of justification
before such a search will be reasonable.” This was so even though the body
cavity search was being conducted to locate drugs, not anything in respect of
which Mr. Greffe could hold a reasonable expectation of privacy.54
Following Grant, the impact on the person’s bodily integrity also
remains relevant to the analysis. Interestingly, in the context of
determining whether a general warrant could have been resorted to for
the penile swab, Moldaver J. acknowledged that there is “clearly a strong
argument” to be made that it does encroach on bodily integrity.55 If that is
so, certain passages in Stillman on that point would be applicable to
penile swabs, including the statement that “completely different concerns
arise where the search and seizure infringes upon a person’s bodily
integrity, which may constitute the ultimate affront to human dignity.”56
50

Fearon, supra, note 17, at para. 55 (italic emphasis by Court; bold emphasis added).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 18, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 652 (S.C.C.) hereinafter “Monney”.
52
See, for instance, Golden, supra, note 2, at paras. 73-74, where the Court explicitly stated
that the border context was central to the analysis in Monney and that the reasoning in border cases is
not directly applicable outside of that context. See also Monney, supra, note 51, at paras. 46 and 48;
and R. v. Simmons, [1988] S.C.J. No. 86, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495, at paras. 49 and 52 (S.C.C.).
53
R. v. Greffe, [1990] S.C.J. No. 32, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 755 (S.C.C.).
54
Id., at para. 49.
55
Saeed, supra, note 1, at para. 70.
56
Stillman, supra, note 3, at para. 39. See also para. 42.
51
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In light of all these statements, what is the correct assessment of the
extent to which a penile swab intrudes upon a person’s dignity, bodily
integrity, and personal privacy?

IX. THE PROFOUND IMPACT OF GENITAL SWABS ON PERSONAL
PRIVACY
A person’s “private parts” are named as such in recognition of the fact
that they reasonably attract a very high expectation of privacy. An
unwelcome intrusion on that part of the body would also be seriously
demeaning of the person’s dignity. Not to mention that “like any
nonconsensual touching of a person’s sexual organs, swabbing a
detainee’s genitals for evidence involves a direct physical interference
with his sexual integrity.”57
That Moldaver J. would state that “the evidence sought … does not
implicate any particular privacy interest of the accused” because “the
DNA belongs to someone else”58 is eyebrow raising considering the
personal privacy interest obviously impacted and the special importance
that has been afforded to this interest. Indeed, in describing the
recognized realms of privacy, Binnie J. in Tessling stated that: “Privacy
of the person perhaps has the strongest claim to constitutional shelter
because it protects bodily integrity, and in particular the right not to have
our bodies touched or explored to disclose objects or matters we wish to
conceal.”59 The reference to “objects or matters” concealed within a body
confirms that the personal privacy interest is not exhausted by the fact
that the evidence seized does not relate to the suspect or reveal
information about him.
The area of the body targeted by the search — and how intrusive the
search of that area is — are of central importance to the strength of a
personal privacy claim. This was the Court’s view, for instance, in the
DNA context in S.A.B.:
57

CLA Factum, supra, note 20, at 2, referring to R. v. Hutchinson, [2014] S.C.J. No. 19,
2014 SCC 19, 2014 1 S.C.R. 346, at para. 102 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Park, [1995] S.C.J. No. 57,
1995 2 S.C.R. 836, at para. 38 (S.C.C.).
58
Saeed, supra, note 1, at para. 55.
59
Tessling, supra, note 43, at para. 21. See also R. v. Pohoretsky, [1987] S.C.J. No. 26,
1987 1 S.C.R. 945, at 949 (S.C.C.). In the United States, personal privacy was also viewed as the
core of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, at least until
King, supra, note 33, came along: see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 and 770-71 (1966)
and Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985), both cited in G.M. Dery III, supra, note 34, at 148-49.
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With regards to privacy related to the person, the taking of bodily
samples under a DNA warrant clearly interferes with bodily integrity.
However, under a properly issued DNA warrant, the degree of offence
to the physical integrity of the person is relatively modest (R. v. F. (S.)
(2000), 141 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 27). A buccal swab is
quick and not terribly intrusive. Blood samples are obtained by pricking
the surface of the skin — a procedure that is, as conceded by the
appellant (at para. 32 of his factum), not particularly invasive in the
physical sense. With the exception of pubic hair, the plucking of hairs
should not be a particularly serious affront to privacy or dignity.60

Justice Moldaver of course acknowledges that there would come a
point where the level of intrusiveness would overcome the fact that the
search does not relate to a bodily sample belonging to the accused. In
fact, he concedes that he might draw the line at an even slightly more
intrusive search, such as one that is “not restricted to the surface of the
skin” as would be the case involving a vaginal swab. The distinction
made between male and female genitalia, on the sole basis that the latter
involves a mild form of penetration, strikes me as the difference between
swabbing a person’s lips as opposed to her inner cheek. Should such a
trivial distinction be so consequential? Certainly where the level of
intrusiveness is markedly different, it matters: consider the distinctions
that have been made between bed pan vigils;61 body cavity searches;62
and, the “high water mark” of performing surgery to retrieve a foreign
object from a person’s body.63 But that such important policy
considerations should turn on such a trivial distinction as the ways in
which male and female genitalia are constructed strikes me as an
approach that, much like Stillman, will lead to incongruous results. Yet
we were led to believe — in Grant — that the Court wanted to move
away from that.
60

S.A.B., supra, note 46, at para. 44.
Where the police adopts a passive role and awaits natural excretion of certain bodily
fluids. In R. v. Poirier, [2016] O.J. No. 3873, 2016 ONCA 582 (Ont. C.A.), for instance, the Ontario
Court of Appeal implied that a bed pan vigil could be conducted pursuant to the common law power
to search incident to arrest, provided it was conducted in a reasonable manner both as it relates to the
duration of the search and the measures taken to protect the person’s security of the person: see
paras. 12 and 68-69.
62
Defined in Golden as involving “a physical inspection of the detainee’s genital or anal
regions”: Golden, supra, note 2, at para. 47. See also para. 48.
63
In Laporte v. Laganière J.S.P. et al., [1972] Q.J. No. 35, 8 C.C.C. (2d) 343 (Que. Q.B.),
the police tried to do just that by obtaining a warrant to retrieve bullets from Mr. Laporte’s body.
Such a search cannot be performed incident to arrest or pursuant to a warrant: see Golden, supra,
note 2, at para. 70.
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X. CONCLUSION
The determination that a significant personal privacy interest is
engaged in a given search does not end the analysis. The valid law
enforcement objectives must be considered in the overall balancing act to
determine whether the search power is available incident to arrest.
And no doubt there can be valid law enforcement objectives served by
the collection of penile swabs, such as there were in Saeed.64 Considering
the potential for disposal or effacement, these objectives are arguably better
served if the search can be conducted incident to arrest. This is particularly
so given the fact that, as all the justices in Saeed surmised, there is likely no
warrant currently available for this procedure.65
However, as Moldaver J. acknowledged, there will be cases where the
privacy interests are so significant that they will effectively be inviolable:
in those cases, law enforcement’s valid goals will be of no matter. The
question of whether a genital swab is one such case should, in my view
and in light of the acute personal privacy interest involved, be revisited.

64

These appear to have been particularly concerning for the majority in this case, in light of
the brutal nature of the offence, a sexual assault causing bodily harm: see paras. 32, 59-61, supra,
note 1. Indeed, one might question whether the same result would have been reached in the face of
less serious allegations or where identity was not truly in issue. Perhaps the threshold for permitting
a penile swab incident to arrest can eventually be nuanced to take into account such factors.
65
A general warrant could likely not be resorted to given the requirement that the search not
interfere with a person’s bodily integrity (s. 487.01(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46).
Justice Moldaver acknowledged that there is a strong argument to be made that a penile swab does
encroach on bodily integrity: Saeed, id., at para. 70.

